Children's understandingo fc ounterfactuale motionss ucha sr egreta nd relief develops relatively late compared to theira bility to imaginec ounterfactualw orlds. We tested whetheralate developmentincounterfactualthinking: understandingcounterfactuals as possibilities, underpinnedc hildren'su nderstanding of regret.T hirty5 -a nd 6-year-olds completedt asks assessingc ounterfactualt hinkinga nd understandingr egret. Performance on thecounterfactualtaskwas better than that on theregrettask. We suggestthat thinking aboutc ounterfactuals as possibilitiesi sanecessaryb ut nots ufficient cognitive developmentinchildren'sunderstanding of regret.W ediscuss howother developments in counterfactual thinking mayu nderpinchildren'se motional understanding.
Sometimes emotional experiences are influenced not only by the situation in which we find ourselves, but also by what could have happened instead.F or example, when a student gets amediocre grade on atest but knowsshe could have worked harder and got atop grade, she will be somewhatnegative about her actual grade. When counterfactual worlds impact on how adults feel about the real world, there can be counter-intuitive consequences. For example, bronze medal winnersl ookh appier than those who win silver (Medvec, Gilovich,&Madey, 1995) . Thism akes sense if the former makea comparison with acounterfactual world in which theywon nothing, and the latter think how theyn early won gold. Here, we focus on children's understanding of situations wheret he counterfactual world is better than the real world, wheno ne might experience regret.
Whiler egret andr eliefa re common experiences fora dults, understandingt hese counterfactual emotions appears relatively late in development. Guttentaga nd Ferrell (2004) read stories to 5-year-olds, 7-year-olds, anda dultsi nw hich twoc haracters experienced thesamenegativeoutcome.F or onecharacter therewas areadily available counterfactual alternative that wouldhaveled to abetteroutcome.For example, oneboy whofelloff hisbikewould normallytakeadifferentroute.Seven-year-olds andadults, but not5-year-olds,consistentlyidentified whowould feel more regret basedontheir choices.
Similarly, Amsel andSmalley (2000) demonstrated that 5-year-olds didnot show evidence of regret whenp laying ag amet hats houldi nducec ounterfactual emotions.P articipants choseb etween twob oxes,k eptt he contents of theirc hosenb ox,a nd ratedh ow happy they were with theirp rize.T hen, theys aw what wasi nt he unchosen box andr e-rated theirown prize. Adults whofoundthatthe unchosen box hadabetter prizethanthe chosen box ratedt hemselves as less happya fter seeing this. However, 5-year-olds's econd ratingswerenot influencedbywhatwas in theunchosenb ox. Thus,until sevenc hildren show no evidence of experiencing regret noru nderstanding whyitoccursinothers.
We know from Amsel'sstudythatchildren couldentertain therelevantcounterfactual world. Children were askedh ow they wouldh avef elti ft heyh ad wont he otherp rize, which5-year-olds foundeasy. This kind of counterfactual thinking,whenchildrenignore what is really thecaseand speculateabout afalse alternative,appears at around 3or4years of age(seeBeck, Riggs, &Gorniak,2008; Harris,German, &Mills,1996; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson,&Mitchell,1998) .For many,thisisthe endofthe storyofcounterfactualthinking development, butl ater developments in children's counterfactual thinking couldb e responsiblefor theirunderstanding of counterfactual emotions.
Twos uggestions are explicit in the literature aboutw hat further development in counterfactual thinking may be critical foru nderstanding regret. Beck, Robinson, Carroll, and Apperly (2006) Guttentag and Ferrrell's (2004) r egret task, it is plausible that this is the result of differences between the samples in the two studies.
An alternative suggestion wasmade by Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) . Theysuggested that what was missing in 5-year-olds'thinking was acomparison between the actual and counterfactual outcomes. Understanding regret requires identification of one'sr eal reaction, one'scounterfactual reaction, and acomparison. According to them, it is this comparison which is critical.
We explored these two claimsbymaking the first comparison betweenaregret task and acounterfactual reasoning task. We adapted Guttentag and Ferrell's(2004) stories to investigate regret and devised an ew task fors tandard and open counterfactual questions following Beck et al. There weretwo possibilities. If children'sunderstanding of regret is dependent on them understanding counterfactuals as possibilities, the two tasks should be of similar difficulty and thereshould be arelation between them. On the other hand,i fc hildren'su nderstanding of regret is limited by their abilityt oc ompare possible worlds, we would expect no relationship and possibly adifference in difficulty. In this case, future workshould makeadirect test of Guttentag and Ferrell'sclaim that an inability to compare the two worlds limits children'sthinking about regret.
Method

Participants
Thirty 5-and 6-year-olds (18 boys,m eana ge 5y ears 3m onths)w ere recruited from a school in Surrey, UK which served apredominantly Caucasian, middle-class population. Procedure There were two regret stories: Pond and Ice Cream,based on Guttentag and Ferrell. In the Pond story, David normally cycles along the yellowpathtoschool, but today takes the red path. At ree has fallen on the red path. Davidh its it and falls offh is bike. The other character,Bob, normally takes the red path, so he is on his typical route when he also falls.T he test question was, 'Who would be more upset about deciding to ride along the red patha round the pond that day?B ob,w ho rides on the red path around the pond everyday,o rD avid, who usually rideso nt he yellow path but decided to ride along the red path today,ordoyou think theywould feel the same?' Guttentag and Ferrell confirmed that adults say that David would feel worse.Weadded an open counterfactual question to the end of the story, 'Could David have gone another way?'. In the Ice cream story, one girl ate her usual dessertand another ate an unusual dessert. Both felt ill.
Materials
In the Road task,w hich assessed counterfactual thinking, the first car drove to the fork in the road as children weretold, 'Sam had decided to go foradrive in his car.He could either go down this roadtothe swimming pool or he could go down this roadto the sweet shop.'The character took one of the roads, 'Today Sam decided to drive down this road to the sweet shop.'C hildren were asked as tandard counterfactual question, 'Whati fh eh ad gone the other way,w here would he be?' or an open counterfactual question, 'Could he have gone anywhere else?'There followed three further trials each using ad ifferent car and driver.W ea lternated standarda nd open counterfactual questions and each child had two standard questions and two openq uestions.W e counterbalanced the order of tasks(regret or road).
Results
Children scored 1f or each correct answer to aq uestion ( Table 1) . We used Wilcoxon paired ranks tests to makec omparisons between question types, making aB onferroni correction, p , : 0125,f or multiple comparisons. 
Discussion
We replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's( 2004) finding that 5-and 6-year-olds do not understand regret. Children didnot recognize that the person who had made an unusual choice wouldb em ore likely to regret it than the person whof ollowed their normal courseo fa ction. We also replicatedB eck et al. 's (2006) fi nding that open counterfactuals are more difficulttoa nswer than standard counterfactuals.
There was aclear difference in difficulty between the two tasks. Children found the open question much easier to answer than the 'Who feels worse?' regret question. Counter to Beck et al. 's suggestion, understanding counterfactualsaspossibilities is not sufficient forc hildren to understand regret. Thisg ives weight to Guttentag and Ferrell'sc laim (2004) that the critical development foru nderstanding regret is comparing the actual and counterfactual worlds. Future researchs hould investigate whetherchildren's performance on regret tasks is correlated with other reasoning tasks involving comparison and, perhaps, whether regret tasks can be made easier by scaffolding the child in making the comparison.
On closer examination there was ap attern in children'sp erformance. No child answered the regret questions correctly without also passingt he open counterfactual question within the regret story(two children obtained alower score on the road open question than on the regret question, which may have been the result of guessing). Thus, childrenwho showed understanding of regret were(almost always) able to think aboutc ounterfactualsa sp ossibilities. Understanding that both were once possibilities may be afi rsts tep in the process of comparing the two outcomes. Perhaps, understanding counterfactuals as possibilities is an ecessaryi fn ot sufficient step towards understanding regret.
Thereisanother important difference betweenthe demandsofthe regret questionsand theo penc ounterfactualq uestions.I nt he former,c hildrenm ay notr ealise that counterfactualsare relevant.However,the reasoningquestions explicitly prompt children to thinkcounterfactually. It is possible that children's difficultyisnot duetolimited abilityto comparebetween thetwo worlds,but resultsfromthemnot spontaneouslyconsidering thea lternative world. Therei sv eryl ittler esearchf ocusingo nc hildren'ss pontaneous counterfactual thinking (exceptionsare Harris,1997; Kujzac &Daly, 1979) . However, in Amsel andS malley's (2000) study, 5-year-oldss uccessfullya nsweredc ounterfactual questionsabout howtheywould have felt if they hadchosenthe otherbox.Despite this explicit prompt,t heys till failed to show regret.T hus, it seemsu nlikelyt hatc hildren's failuret oc onsidert he counterfactual spontaneouslyc ould be thes olec ause of their difficultywithregret.
In conclusion, we considered whether cognitive developments in children's counterfactual thinking may underpin their apparently late developing understanding of regret. Recognising counterfactualsa sp ossibilities that could once have replaced the actual world was not the critical development in children'sunderstanding of regret, but may be necessary. In line with Guttentag and Ferrell (2004) ,wesuggest that being able to compare counterfactual and actual world permits understanding of regret. Although, this hypothesis was not tested here, future researchinvestigating this claim will advance our understanding of children'st hinking aboutregret.
